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Cooperation: Toward a Revision
of the Concept and its Application
Charles E. Curran, S.J.

Questions of cooperation arise
when a person - either an individual person or a moral person
- works together with another
in producing a particular action.
Ethical problems result when the
person is asked to cooperate in

Father Curran's discussion revolves around the limitations imposed on the individual's freedom
to act according to the dictates
of his conscience. He directs his
attention primarily to the questions of sterilization, abortion and
the cooperating physician.
Father Curran is a professor of
M oral Theology at the Catholic
University of America.

an act which he believes to be
wrong. Such problems will frequently occur in a pluralistic society where there are conflicting
ethical beliefs.
Cooperation has been an important topic in Catholic moral
theology especially in the twen-
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tieth century. To illustrate this
point one can readily find in the
literature of moral theology many
references to questions involving
cooperation. Journals published
for priests in all languages generally contained a section in
which a moral theologian responded to ethical problems and questions, and problems of cooperation
were frequently discussed. For
example, John McCarthy in the
1950's published two volumes belonging to the genre of responses
to cases of conscience.! These responses had originally been published by him for the guidance of
priests and confessors in the Irish
Ecclesiastical Record in the fifteen year period before their publication in book form.
On at least ten different occasions in these volumes McCarthy
responds to questions involving
problems of cooperation in various areas - cooperating in giving
a Protestant minister bread and
wine for a communion service;
financial support for the building
of Protestant churches; cooperat-
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mg in the OxfO'rd GrO'up m0'vement; abO'rti0'n; c0'0'perati0'n 0'f a
landlady in the acts 0'f her tenants; c0'O'perati0'n 0'f a w0'rker
with an empl0'yer wh0' asks him t0'
cheat; restituti0'n coming fr0'm
c00'perati0'n; a SP0'use c0'0'perating
with the use 0'f artificial C0'ntraception; a lawyer and his client;
a dO'ct0'r and his patient. 2
Medical ethics 0'bvi0'usly furnishes many questi0'ns 0'f c0'0'perati0'n. The Catholic textb0'0'ks in
medical ethics invariably outline
the accepted teaching within the
Cath0'lic Church 0'n c0'operation,
0'ften in the context of general
principles which will then be applied t0' the specific questi0'ns 0'f
medical ethics. Edwin Healy, f0'r
example, devotes more than ten
pages t0' the discussiO'n 0'f C0'0'perati0'n and treats such practical
cases as illicit 0'perati0'ns, aborti0'n, contracepti0'n, sterilizati0'n,
medical partnership, summ0'ning
a non-Catholic clergyman f0'r a
dying patient, calling attenti0'n
t0' mistakes in surgery.3 Questi0'ns
0'f this type are O'bviously still
arising at the present time.
In the m0're recent periodical
literature 0'n the American scene
there is great emphasis today 0'n
the role 0'f Catholic h0'spitals.
Catholic h0'spitals adhere t0' the
Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Facilities pr0'P0'sed by the American bish0'Ps in
their present f0'rm in 1971. 4 Many
people in society in general and
sO'me within the R0'man Cath0'lic
Church d0' not agree with all the
teachings c0'ntained in these directives. ; Legal cases have been
August, 1974

brought against Cath0'lic h0'spitals to perform sterilizati0'ns.
Some fear that Cath0'lic h0'spitals
may be faced with C0'urt 0'rders
t0' perf0'rm O'ther types 0'f now f0'rbidden 0'perati0'ns including abortions. While there is a feeling
am0'ng a few that Catholic h0'spitals will not be able t0' c0'ntinue
to exist in this country in the
future if they adhere t0' their
ethical code, others maintain
there is a legal and c0'nstitutional
right for Catholic h0'spitals t0'
c0'ntinue t0' exist and t0' act in
acc0'rd with their stated religi0'us
code of ethics. 6
Pr0'blems involving the Cath0'lic hospital are very c0'mplex,
since they involve matters O'f federal funding and the rights 0'f
non-Catholics. Much 0'f the discussion has been in terms 0'f the
legal aspects 0'f the questi0'n, but
it is imp0'rtant to' rec0'gnize the
moral and ethical aspects. This
present paper cann0't attempt to
s0'lve definitively these very complicated issues, but it will try t0'
clarify the understanding 0'f C0'operati0'n and thus pr0'vide indicati0'ns f0'r soluti0'ns to these
questiO'ns.
The Teaching of The Manuals
on C00'perati0'n
The teaching of the manuals 0'f
m0'ral theol0'gy and 0'f medical
ethics 0'n cooperati0'n f0'llows the
same pattern and C0'mes t0' the
same general c0'nclusions alth0'ugh
there is 0'ccasi0'nally different termin0'I0'gy. C0'0'perati0'n is 0'ften
defined as the concurrence with
an0'ther person in an act which is
m0'rally wr0'ng. Cooperation may
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be either positive or negative, but
the more important distinction
exists between formal and material cooperation. Formal cooperation, by which the cooperator consents to the sin or the bad will of
the principal actor (either explicitly by intending the sin or implicitly by immediate cooperation
in an action which is intrinsically
wrong), is always wrong. Some authors, e.g., Merkelbach, describe
the second type of cooperation as
immediate material cooperation
because one does not explicitly
join his will with the evil will of
the principal actor, but such cooperation is nonetheless always
wrong. 8 Material cooperation,
since it helps one perform an evil
action but does not involve concurrence with the bad will, is
wrong but can be justified if proportionate reasons exist with
more serious reasons required
when the cooperation is more involved in the act of the principal
agent.
Catholic ethicists developed a
casuistry to indicate how prudence should decide different cases
of material cooperation. 9 Remote
and nonnecessary cooperation can
be justified by a slight reason; for
example, an ordeply can work for
a hospital in which abortions are
performed merely because of the
salary he receives. Remote, necessary or proximate, nonnecessary
cooperation can be justified for a
grave reason, whereas proximate,
necessary cooperation can be justified only for a notably grave
reason. Thus a doctor may serve
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as a first assistant at an illicit
operation if he fears that otherwise he might lose his position
provided that he not do the actual
illicit operation itself. Catholic
nurses, whose cooperation is
somewhat less proximate, may assist at illicit operations in a state
institution even though they
could find employment elsewhere
because they can do much good
in these institutions and thus
compensate for the occasional and
unavoidably material cooperation
in evil. 10 Proximate, necessary
cooperation in an act which harms
a third person can be justified
only to avoid a similar or slightly
less evil to one's self. Thus a
pharmacist may give poison to a
man who is going to kill his wife
if the man threatens the pharmacist with a gun if he refuses to
cooperate. Cooperation which is
proximately necessary for a grave
public evil cannot be justified by
any private advantage.
The general teaching on cooperation as well as the rules of
prudence are proposed in just
about the same way by all the
authors of textbooks. The manuals of moral theology which generally follow the pattern of the
ten commandments in their structure (especially those of the J esuit and Redemptorist schools)
treat cooperation as one of the
sins against charity. Cooperation
is thus closely associated with
scandal, another sin against charity, which is defined as any deed
or word which is sinful or seemingly sinful and affords another
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the occasion of spiritual ruin. 1 1
Benedict Merkelbach and other
authors following the Dominican
tradition consider cooperation under external causes of sin, whereas scandal is discussed under the
virtue of charity.1 2 However these
are comparatively minor questions of structure and do not affect the general agreement found
among all authors.
History of The Concept
Although there is general agreement on the meaning and rules
affecting cooperation, this teaching as it exists in the manuals
does not go back to the explicit
teaching of Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas does not make the distinction between material and
formal cooperation with the respective definitions as found in
the manuals. In one place in the
Summa Theologiae Thomas discusses cooperation in the context
of restitution. Here Aquinas accepts the traditionally enumerated ways in which one can cooperate in the act of another. The
Angelic Doctor maintains that in
five cases the one who helps in
the act of another is held to restitution although the primary obligation of restitution rests with
the primary cause of the act (IIII, q.62, a.2). In another context
Aquinas accepts the fact that the
artisan commits a sin in making
things such as idols which cannot
be used by others without sin
(II-II, q.169, a.2, ad.4).
Thomas Sanchez, one of the
most important figures in the history of moral theology who died
at the beginning of the 17th cenAugust, 1974

tury, considers cooperation as a
particular case of scandal but
does raise questions about cooperating with acts that are indifferent and with acts that are
intrinsically wrong. Although Sanchez talks about intrinsically
wrong actions, there is ambiguity
about whether his terminology refers to acts understood in their
essence or acts which are intrinsically wrong in the concrete circumstances. It was up to later
theologians to differentiate theoretically in a more accurate manner between cooperation and
scandal and also to introduce the
accepted terminology of material
and formal cooperation. 13
The seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries in Catholic moral theology witnessed a struggle between laxists and rigorists which
was marked by papal intervention
condemning extremes on both
sides. 14 In 1679, sixty five propositions were condemned by the
Holy Office, many of which had
originally been proposed for condemnation at the University of
Louvain. Li One condemned proposition stated that a servant who
knowingly helped his master to
climb through a window to ravish
a virgin does not sin mortally if
he does it through fear of great
harm or loss. 16 Subsequently theologians debated about the exact
meaning of this condemnation
and the reason for it. Is this act
condemned because it is intrinsically wrong in all circumstances
or is it condemned because there
is not a sufficient reason to justify it in this case? Before St.
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Alphonsus the vast majority of
theologians held the former opinion, but some few did maintain
the latterY St. Alphonsus Liguori, the outstanding moral theologian of the eighteenth century,
who was later declared a doctor
of the Church and patron of moral theologians and confessors, in
the first edition of his moral theology (which was basically a
commentary on the text of Herman Busembaum) proposed the
opinion that such acts were intrinsically wrong. 18
In subsequent editions of his
moral theology, however, Alphonsus adopted the second opinion.
Such a development set the stage
for a discussion of the meaning
of an intrinsically wrong act and
for pointing out the differences
between material and formal cooperation. Alphonsus argues that
the acts of the servant are not
intrinsically wrong so the cooperation is only material. But the
crime of ravaging a virgin is so
monstrous that only a reason of
extreme necessity such as a fear
of death could excuse and justify
the cooperation. In his theoretical exposition Alphonsus distinguishes between formal and material cooperation, describing the
formal as concurring with the bad
will of the other which is always
wrong. Material cooperation, on
the other hand, concurs only to
the bad action of the other. Formal cooperation always involves
an influence on the will of the
principal agent, but this can take
place in a twofold manner - by
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intending the evil or by cooperating immediately in an act whic;:h
is intrinsically wrong and thus
influencing the will of the other.
In material cooperation the act
itself cannot be intrinsically
wrong but must be good or indifferent. 19
Alphonsus thus presents the
framework within which cooperation has been discussed in Roman
Catholic theology to the present
time. The only theoretical point
of difference in the contemporary
discussions, as pointed out above,
concerns whether or not cooperation in an intrinsically wrong act
is formal cooperation or immediate material cooperation. In
practice, however, there is no difference because no author would
justify cooperation in such a
case despite the difference in
theoretical understandings. It is
precisely this question of cooperation with an act which is intrinsically wrong which has been
frequently emphasized in the Roman Catholic teachings on cooperation with non-Catholic worship services, the publishing of
immoral books, cooperation in
onanism or cooperation in medical operations which are judged
to be intrinsically wrong.
In my judgment there is an element missing in the accepted understanding of cooperation, and
the inclusion of this element calls
for theoretical and practical
changes in this teaching. The
missing aspect refers to the subjectivity and rights of conscience
of the person who is acting. The
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older definitions assume that one
concurs with either the bad will
or the bad act of the principal
actor. But the important thing is
to realize that one is cooperating
with a person and not just with
an act or a will. Thus one must
consider the rights of the person
in this case and not merely the
factor of a bad will or a bad act
although these do remain important considerations but not the
only ones. A comparison with the
newer teaching on religious liberty in the Roman Catholic
Church should indicate why one
must begin to see cooperation also
in terms of the person and not
just in terms of the will or the
act.
The Teaching On
Religious Freedom
The older approach within Roman Catholic theology denied religious liberty in the name of objective truth. The Roman Catholic Church sees itself as the one,
true Church of Jesus Christ and
all persons, as well as the state,
have an obligation to accept that
truth. To the plea that there
should be freedom of conscience
in this matter so that people can
worship God according to the dictates of their own conscience, the
reply was frequently given that
error has no rights. In practice
for prudential reasons of avoiding
even greater problems, however,
one could tolerate the separation
of church and state and the existence of religious liberty in the
state.2Q
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The Declaration on Religious
Freedom of Vatican II begins by
recognizing that the dignity of
the human person has been impressing itself more deeply on
contemporary human consciousness with the resulting demand
that men should act more and
more on their own judgment in
responsible freedom and not driven by coercion. Today there is a
great demand for freedom in human society especially in those
things pertaining to the human
spirit and the free exercise of religion. 2 l
There are three aspects of the
teaching of this document that
are of particular importance for
our present considerations. First,
the document very early defines
the meaning of religious liberty
and how it fits in with the selfunderstanding of the Roman
Catholic Church. The final and
approved text very quickly asserts that the one, true religion
subsists in the Roman Catholic
Church and all men are bound to
seek the truth. Religious liberty
based on the dignity of the human person involves immunity
from external coercion so that no
one is forced to act contrary to
his beliefs, nor is anyone to be
restrained from acting in accord
with his religious beliefs. This
right inheres in the dignity of the
person and therefore continues
to exist even in those who do not
live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it.
Religious liberty does not mean
that the individual person does
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not have the obligation to seek
the truth as revealed to us by
God in Jesus Christ. 22
Secondly, the document wisely
does not solve a problem that was
and continues to be debated
among Catholic thinkers - the
theoretical basis for religious liberty. The document bases religious freedom on the dignity of the
human person as this is known
through human reason and revelation, but it prudently does not
attempt to give anyone theoretical reason and mentions a number of arguments that were
proposed at that time - the right
and duty to follow conscience
which was included in the final
document in a subsidiary and not
in the central place; the dignity
of the human person and the constitutional principle of the limitation of the state in matters of religion, which through the efforts
especially of John Courtney Murray had become central in the
third and fourth texts of the declaration, was mentioned in the
final document but does not receive primacy; 2.l the argument
from freedom based on a scriptural approach is also included:
the argument from the right and
duty to seek the truth has primary place in the final document
both in terms of position and in
terms of the number of lines devoted to it, but the other reasons
given above are also mentioned. 2~
This indicates there is still quite
a bit of work to do in trying to
discover the exact theoretical basis for the teaching on religious
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liberty although all are agreed
that the teaching rests on the dignity of the human person as
known through faith and reason
even though the precise form of
its justification remains open to
discussion.
A third important question
concerns the limits on religious
freedom . Obviously in any society
the rights of some people might
conflict with the rights of others
or society itself. The document
rightly sees the primary limitation in terms of the personal and
social responsibility of the individual. The rights of others as
well as our duties toward them
must be respected. In addition,
society itself has the duty to defend itself, but government interference cannot be arbitrary and
must be in conformity with the
objective moral order. The Declara tion sees the justification of
interference by the state in terms
of the criterion of the public
order.2;
The question of the limitation
of the right to religious liberty developed in the course of the discussions and of the drafts before
the final document was approved.
The first criterion proposed in
the historical evolution of the
text was the common good, but it
was felt that this term was too
broad and open to possible arbitrariness and abuse. The criterion of the objective end of society was proposed and rejected
for the same reasons. The term
public order, which is frequently
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used in the constitutions of many
modern states and which bears
some similarity to the concept of
penal laws of the state employed
as a criterion in a similar case by
Pope Pius XII, was finally adopted. 26 Public order is that fundamental part of the common good
which is confided to the political
authorities.27 To overcome the
fear of some that the concept of
public order was too limiting in
its understanding of the role of
the state especially in matters of
social justice, the second introductory report of the textus reemendatus (the fourth schemaF~
emphasized that the concept of
public order was applied to questions of religious freedom and did
not concern matters of social justice and the way the state should
act in achieving such justice.
According to the final document public order embraces three
essential elements - to safeguard
the rights of citizens (an order
of justice), to maintain the public
peace and to protect public morality. 29 It should be noted that
the public morality here referred
to is not an agreement on all matters of morality but those minimal standards of public morality
which are required for human beings to live together in society. 3D
Thus an objective criterion is determined for the state's right to
interfere in the religious liberty of
its subjects. For example, the
state thus could prohibit the use
of human sacrifice in a particular
religion because this goes against
the order of justice which re-
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quires the safeguarding of the
right to life of all citizens. In the
light of this criterion one must
consider the action of the state
concerning polygamy or blood
transfusions for children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
A Revised Understanding
of Cooperation
The teaching on religious liberty has both similarities and dissimilarities with the question of
cooperation. First it is important
to point out the dissimilarities.
Cooperation refers to the fact
that the individual positively concurs in the act of the principal
agent. In the case of religious liberty there is no concurrence with
the act of the other person but
rather there is the recognition
that society has to allow the person to perform those acts based
on his religious beliefs. Also religious liberty concerns the relationship of the government to the
individual and not the relationship of one individual to another.
In addition, religious liberty is
not exactly the same as all other
kinds of liberty. Since religious
freedom refers to matters of such
great importance, it can be somewhat differentiated from other
types of freedom.
The argument for a changed
understanding of cooperation does
not rest on an exact parallel with
the question of religious liberty.
However, the analogy with religious liberty is used to indicate
that in both cases the dignity of
the human person and the rights
of the human person to act with
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responsible freedom must be taken into account. The older approach denying religious liberty
emphasized the concept of objective truth rather than the dignity
of the person. Roman Catholic
moral theology in general has
rightly been critized for the fact
that its moral teaching in the last
few centuries has given so much
emphasis to the objective and
even the physical that it has not
given enough importance to subjectivity and freedom. The newer
approach to religious liberty recognizes this fact and indicates a
dimension that had not heretofore been considered. In the case
of cooperation it seems that one
must also consider the right of
the individual person to act in
accord with one's own decision of
conscience.
The older approach to cooperation understood the action of the
cooperator as concurring with the
will or the act of the other person.
If the will was bad or if the act
was bad, then there was either
formal or material cooperation.
But is it adequate to describe the
action merely as cooperating with
a bad will or a bad action? This
could be a partial explanation,
but a more adequ~te description
understands cooperation as concurring not primarily with a will
or with an act but with a person.
The person, however, may have a
bad will (e.g., a criminal planning
a robbery) or may do a bad act
(write a knowingly false article).
The point is that the full understanding of cooperation must take
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account of the dignity of the other person and that person's right
to act in accord with his own responsible freedom. Nevertheless,
one cannot ignore the elements of
a bad will or a bad act which have
been part of the consideration in
the past.
There is another factor which
should also change somewhat the
traditional teaching on cooperation. As mentioned, one of the
most important parts of the Roman Catholic teaching has been
the fact that one cannot cooperate with an action which is intrinsically wrong. However, there
is much dispute today even within Roman Catholic theology
about the whole question of
what, if anything, is intrinsically
wrong. 3 1
At the very minimum, we are
often dealing with cases in which
the individual person does not believe that his or her action is in
any way wrong although I might
believe it is wrong. In these cases
even in accord with the older understanding it is impossible to
speak about the bad will of the
primary agent. The older Catholic theology recognized that there
could be invincible ignorance in
these cases. There can be no formal cooperation when the individual involved does not have a bad
will. There are two other factors
that must be mentioned. Above
all, there is the right of the cooperator to act in accord with his
conscience so that he cannot be
forced to do something he believes is wrong. Also there are
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limits on the rights of the principal agent which in my judgment
are similar to the limits placed on
religious freedom and governed
by the criterion of public order
with its threefold content of an
order of justice, an order of peace
and an order of common morality.
The Doctor
How does this understanding
of cooperation work in practice?
Take as example the doctor who
believes in his own conscience
that sterilization is wrong when
done for contraceptive purposes
but has a patient who believes it
is morally and medically good.32
Here is a conflict of rights - the
rights of both to follow their own
conscience. In normal circumstances one can readily uphold
the right of both persons to act in
accord with their own conscience.
The doctor in conscience can refuse to do what he believes to be
wrong, and the patient can find
another doctor to perform the operation. Obviously society profits
very much if we respect the freedom of individuals in these matters. Moral integrity certainly
calls for people to act in accord
with their conscience, and the
neutral outsider can applaud the
actions of both.
Could the doctor come to a different conclusion? In the past the
traditional approach of Roman
Catholic theology would not allow
the doctor to come to another answer because the act is intrinsically wrong. However, the doctor
can do such an operation without
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cooperating with the bad will of
the patient because the patient
has no bad will in this case. The
doctor could argue that although
he thinks the action is wrong the
patient has the right to obtain
the needed medical care that one
needs and wants. In this society
we daily live with people who do
things we believe are wrong.
Without unduly sacrificing his
own conscientious principles, the
doctor could argue that in this
case he is providing the service
for which this individual person
has a right even though he himself disagrees with the operation
from a moral perspective. The
doctor by his action is not saying
that this particular operation is
right but he is saying that the
person has the right to this particular operation even if the doctor is opposed to it on moral
grounds.
Does not such a solution open
the door to justifying any type
of cooperation? No. There are
limits on the cooperation as proposed in the criterion of public
order. One should not cooperate
with another if this harms the
public order - the rights of other innocent persons, the peace
and common morality of society.
Thus one could not immediately
cooperate in lying or stealing
which are opposed to the common
morality necessary for public order.
The above argumentation in no
way implies that the doctor is
just a conduit or robot who has
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no freedom in this matter. There
is no doubt that in this case the
doctor is an immediate cooperator, and he could refuse such cooperation because of his own
conscience claims. But by accepting the fact of a pluralistic society
and the rights of the other person he could in good conscience
perform the sterilization for someone who believes it is medically
and morally indicated.
Could the doctor perform an
abortion in similar circumstances?
The patient believes there is nothing wrong with such an abortion
in this particular case, but the
doctor believes it is the immoral
killing of an innocent human being. There remains a great difference between this and the case
of sterilization , for here harm is
done to a third, innocent party.
If the doctor truly believes abortion to be the killing of innocent
persons, I do not see how he could
ever perform such an operation
except in the most extreme cases.
One cannot immediately cooperate with another person to act in
accord with this person's conscientious decision if such an action is going to cause disproportionate harm to another person
or to society. Thus ··in this question the limits of cooperation,
which are somewhat similar to
the limits proposed in the case of
religious liberty, become determinative. In this case it is not
simply the right of the doctor and
the right of the patient but also
the right of the innocent third
party (at least according to the
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doctor's belief) that must be taken into consideration.
Catholic Hospitals
What about the case of Catholic hospitals today? Recent discussions of this question have
concentrated on the legal perspective. Court cases have been
brought against Catholic hospitals to make them perform operations which they believe are
illicit, but as of early 1974 there
has been no final decision ordering a Catholic hospital to perform
a sterilization. 11 In the case of abortion the Supreme Court in the
Georgia case upheld the constitutionality of a conscience clause
permitting exemptions both for
personnel and hospitals from performing abortions if it was against
their conscientious beliefs. 34
From the legal perspective one
can argue that the situation of
the Catholic hospital is now
changed because often it is a hospital serving the total community
and because it receives much
money from government sources
in terms of Hill-Burton funds,
exemptions from personal income
and property taxes, and tax dollars in Medicare and Medicaid.
Therefore the state has the right
to make sure all citizens can be
served in these hospitals and
can have operations which are
medically indicated even though
against the moral code of the
sponsoring agent of the hospital.
The opposite side argues that the
right to practice religion in the
dispensation of health care is a
constitutional right protected by

Linacre Quarterly

the First Amendment. If t he corporate by-laws of Catholic hospitals show their adherence to a
moral code, these ri ghts to practice in this way must be upheld
by society. 3;
The discussion in this article
will consider only the moral aspects of the pro blem a lthough
t hese a re quite intertwined with
some of the legal aspects. No one
can deny the right of the Catholic hospital to exist and to follow
its own moral code. Does t he fact
that they serve a total community and receive governmen t funds
do away with t his right? H ere
again there is a collision of rights
- the right of the Catholi c hospital to exist and put into practice its own mora l teaching a nd
the right of all citi zens to have
the medical care and treatment
deemed appropriate. There is no
doubt that in ma ny situations in
la rge metropolitan centers both
rights can be guaranteed without
harm to others. Collisions could
arise a nd will a ri se where the
Catholic fa cility is t he only one
servin g a particular area. Here a
possible conflict a rises .
One could make a case for the
Catholic hospital's righ t to live
by its mora l code even in the
midst of our pluralistic society. I
would urge a more nuan ced approach to the question and distinguish a gain between the cases
of sterilization and of abortion .
The Catholic hospital could main tain its own prescribed teaching
on sterilization a nd still recognize
t he righ ts of ot her people to act
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in accord with their own personal
decision. Since no innocen t persons would be hurt by su ch a procedure a nd since t he society as
such would not be hurt, I see no
reason why Catholic hospitals
could not in good mora l conscience make the decision to a llow
people t o have sterilizations in
Catholic hospitals. The cooperation of the hospital is less proximate than t hat of the doctor doing t he sterili za tion . Once again
in t his case one can argue that
t he Catholic hospita l in no way
approves t he particular action
ta ken but acknowledges t he ri gh t
of the individua l t o act in accord
with conscience provided that the
rights of other innocen t persons
a nd of society a re not harmed.
There are other considerations
which also argue in favor of t his
position. Above all, one must recognize the fact that wi t hin Roman Catholicism today there is
much dissent on the question of
steri lization. Many Roma n Catholic theologians and people believe there is nothing mora lly
wrong with contraceptive sterilization in man y ci rcumstan ces. -le ,
In theory one must admit the
possibility of dissent in the question of contraceptive sterilization.
Is it possible then for the Church
to operate Catholic hospitals in
which Catholics are not a ble to
exercise their right to dissent?
This intra-Catholic disagreement
at the present time is a n even
stron ger reason for allowing sterilizations in Catholic hospials.
Some of the arguments pro-
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posed by Catholics to sustain
their moral and legal right to operate hospitals according to their
ethical code properly point out
that other religious groups within
society are also striving to maintain their rights to act in accordance with their own principles.
For example, mention is frequently made of the practice of the
Mennonites and Amish with regard to education. I applaud the
defense of the religious freedom
of these groups, but there are differences. The problem concerns
the non-Catholic in C'ltholic hospitals and the freedom of that
person. There is also an important ecclesiological difference between Roman Catholisism and
many forms of sectarian Christianity. Roman Catholicism as a
Church has opted for a stance of
cooperation with the world even
though it recognizes at times it
should and must disagree with
what is happening in the world.
On the other hand the sectarian
groups in Christianity have generally based their beliefs on a
withdrawal from the world and
the recognition of an inherent incompatibility between the world
and the gospel message. Thus,
from an ecclesiological viewpoint
one cannot make a perfect identity between the sects who wish to
follow their own teaching and the
Catholic Church which by definition has always been much more
open to cooperation with the
world.
What about abortion? Just as
in the case of the individual doc-
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tor so too in the case of the hospital there is an important new
element in this case. Present
Catholic teaching believes that
one much act as if human life is
present from the very beginning
of conception. Therefore abortion
is looked upon as the killing of
innocent human life. One could
argue very strongly in this case
that the Catholic hospitals should
never cooperate with abortion because to do so would bring harm
to the innocent human being who
Catholic ethical teaching believes
to be present. Here it is not just
a question of providing the person with the opportunity to act in
accord with the personal decision
that has been reached, but there
is the added factor of the innocent human life. Thus I believe a
distinction can and should be
made between cooperation in
cases of sterilization on the part
of the Catholic hospital and cooperation in cases of abortion.
The argument can also be made
from the ethical perspective that
society should always respect the
conscience of the individuai when
it comes to a matter of taking human life. In many ways it has
been one of the principal reasons
proposed by those, including the
American bishops, who have argued in the United States for the
existence of selective conscientious objection to participation in
warY It is admitted that in a
pluralistic society there are bound
to be conflicts of beliefs and of
rights but society also recognizes
that the most important value we
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have is the value of human life.
To uphold the belief of those who
do not want to participate in
what they believe to be the wrong
killing of human life is one very
important way in which society
can promote the sanctity and dignity of human life. In this regard
it seems that the action of the Supreme Court in the Georgia case
asserting the right of conscientious exemption in the matter of
abortion is in accord with the
best ethical understanding of society and the role of government
in society.
One must also raise here the
fact that even on the matter of
abortion there can be dissent
within the Roman Catholic
Church. As a matter of fact, there
is some dissent on abortion but
less than in the matter of sterilization. 38 However, because of the
nature of what is involved I believe even those who dissent
should be willing to uphold the
right of the majority of Roman
Catholics at the present time to
give this communal witness in our
society.
This article has attempted to
revise the theoretical understanding of cooperation in evil in the
light of the teaching proposed in
the Declaration on Religious Freedom. 39 By accepting both a qualified right of the individual to act
in accord with the dictates of his
conscience and the limitations
which can be placed on that right
a different concept of cooperation
has been proposed and applied to
the cooperation of doctors and
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Catholic hospitals in the questions of sterilization and of abortion.
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